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Maintaining Order Through On-Site
Inspection: Focus On the IAEA
Stephen Gorove*
1HE RIGHT to conduct inspection and verification procedures
on the territory of a sovereign state under the auspices of an
international body or by representatives of a foreign country has be-
come firmly institutionalized in recent times, perhaps most signifi-
candy in the field of interna-
tional control of the peaceful
THE AUTHOR (J.D., University of Buda- uses of atomic energy. Within
pest, LLM., J.S.D., Ph.D., Yale Uni-
versity) is presently Director of the the overall historical contours
Graduate Program in Law at the Univer- and trend perspectives that spa-
sity of Mississippi School of Law, and his dal limitations permit, the
reaching specialties include Comparative
Law, Criminal Law and Procedure, Inter- present contribution focuses on
national Law, International Transactions, the case of a global organiza-
and Jurisprudence. He is the author of
the book Law and Politics of the Danube. tion: the inspection system of
the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA).'
I. THE BACKGROUND OF ON-SITE INSPECTION
(1892-1917)
Even a cursory glance at the historical background reveals that
international on-the-spot inspection and verification rights have
been granted and exercised many times in areas entirely unrelated
to the realm of atomic energy. Numerous such instances come
* This article is the outgrowth of a study and on-the-spot survey sponsored by the
American Society of International Law, involving international procedures and tech-
niques developed to control the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The author gratefully
acknowledges the generous support and counsel obtained from the Society and its Ad-
visory Group as well as the assistance received - through personal interviews - from
officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This article expresses solely the
views of the author.
1 For general information and background on the IAEA and its safeguards system,
see Bechhoefer & Stein, Atoms for Peace: The New International Atomic Energy Agency,
55 MIcI. L. RE . 747 (1957); Gorove, Humaniing the Atom: Establishment of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, 3 N.Y.L.F. 245 (1957); Hall, The Safeguards
Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in 2 DIsARMAMENTS & ARMS CON-
TROL 170 (1964); Isenbergh, The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
in 1 LAW AND AJ)mSTRATEON 219 (Marks ed. 1959); Stoessinger, Atoms for Peace:
The International Atomic Energy Agency, in ORGAImzING PEACE IN THE NuCLEAR
AGE 117 (1959); Willrich, Safeguarding Atoms for Peace, 60 Am J. INT'L L. 34
(1966).
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readily to mind in connection, for instance, with armistice agree-
ments and peace treaties, nonintervention and neutrality pacts,
boundary determinations, investigations, and inquiries, visit and
search of vessels, administration of international waterways, Ant-
arctica, and, most recently, outer space.2
There is a long line of armistice (truce and cease-fire) agree-
ments and peace treaties which provide for the establishment of
commissions to supervise, by on-the-spot investigation, if necessary,
compliance with the terms of the relevant agreement. Since armi-
stices and peace treaties are a regular follow-up to hostilities and
wars which may or may not result in complete surrender or victory
for one side, the composition, on-site investigatory powers, and
functions of the commission are normally dependent on the out-
come of the war. If the war results in total victory for one side, the
commission is usually made up of representatives of the victorious
nation or nations and is given sweeping authority to supervise exe-
cution of the agreements. If the war results in a stalemate, a mixed
commission is usually created and is comprised of representatives
of the belligerents. Occasionally, the commission may also include
representatives of neutral nations. The investigatory powers and
functions of such commissions are largely limited to the area adja-
cent to the demarcation line.
Akin to commissions established to supervise armistice agree-
ments and peace treaties are inspection commissions to ensure non-
intervention and neutrality in relation to a particular country.
These commissions may be empowered to investigate alleged viola-
tions of neutrality such as the introduction of foreign regular and
irregular troops, arms, and war materials into a country. Boundary
commissions may also perform physical inspections and verifications
on foreign soil. Normally their function is to establish lines of de-
marcation which will constitute the boundary between states. For
this purpose, the commissions carry out their on-the-spot investiga-
tions in accordance with instructions in the relevant agreement.
In addition to boundary commissions and commissions created
to supervise the implementation of armistice agreements, peace
2 Information regarding the historical background may be found in most interna-
tional law textbooks and digests. For additional details and references, see FAUCIuIJ,
TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (4th ed. 1926); HERTsLET, THE MAP OF
EUROPE BY TREATY (2d ed. 1891); McDouGAL, LASSWELL & VLASic, LAW AND
PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE (1963); OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw (Lauterpacht ed.
1955); SCHiWAIZmBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1960); INSTRUC-
TION FOR THE NAvY OF THE UNITED STATEs GOVERNING MATm WARFAER
(1917).
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treaties, and nonintervention or neutrality pledges, there have also
been commissions of investigation and inquiry set up for the deter-
mination or verification of certain facts. Such commissions may be
authorized to investigate all the circumstances of an incident and,
toward this end, may have the power to interrogate witnesses and
secure all necessary information.
Another example of on-site inspection and verification rights is
related to the field of visit and search. Under generally recognized
rules of international law, men-of-war may exercise the right of
visit and search in order to maintain the safety of the high seas
against piracy. They have the power to require suspicious private
vessels on the open sea to show their flags and, in case of further
suspicion, to stop and visit them to inspect their papers and verify
their flags.
In time of peace international agreements have frequently pro-
vided for the mutual right of visit and search of vessels in connec-
tion, for instance, with the suppression of slave trade and the regu-
lation of fisheries.
Apart from instances of piracy or specific stipulations of inter-
national agreements, the right of visit and search is strictly a bellig-
erent right which may be carried out on the high seas and in non-
neutral waters against any merchant ship for the purpose of ascer-
taining its character and nationality and verifying whether it carries
cargo prohibited by international law or whether it has committed
any violation of a blockade. Normally there must be at least rea-
sonable suspicion that a vessel or its cargo is nonneutral in charac-
ter or carries contraband to justify exercise of the right. If it is
ascertained during the visit that there is a deficiency in the ship's
papers, the ship is considered suspect and may be searched. If the
search fails to dispel the suspicion but produces no proof of giilt,
the vessel may be seized and brought to a port for examination.
In modem warfare vessel size and the use of submarines have
made searches at sea extremely hazardous. Therefore, the practice
developed of diverting ships into port for search instead of search-
ing them on the high seas. While this procedure was contested by
the neutrals, it was urged that such control over ships was in their
own interest in view of the submarine menace. In such cases,
navicerts may provide a convenient solution because they serve as
safe-conducts for ships which submit to voluntary inspection in the
port of departure by officials of a belligerent. Inspected ships are
then issued papers which are recognized by the naval authorities in
1967] 1527
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charge of contraband control. Analogous to the right of visit and
search of vessels is the right of visit and search of an amphibian air-
craft, since it is considered to be a vessel while it is afloat. Mention
should also be made of a number of international commissions
which were established to implement treaty provisions with regard
to the navigation of such international waterways as the Elbe, Oder,
Danube, Rhine, and the Dardanelles. Most of these commissions
were given fairly broad authority, including, in some cases, the right
to conduct on-site investigations.3
Relatively few of the examples relating to the foregoing areas
fall neatly into the quarter-century spanning from 1892 to 1917;
most of them arose either before or after this period. Among those
which occurred during that time, reference may be made, for in-
stance, to Article 9 of the Hague Convention of 1899 for the Pacific
Settlement of Disputes, recommending that in the case of an irrec-
oncilable dispute arising out of differences of opinion on points of
fact and involving neither honor nor vital interests, which the
parties could not resolve by diplomatic negotiation, they should, so
far as possible, institute an international commission of inquiry.
The first widely known commission of inquiry was created fol-
lowing the well-known "Dogger-Bank" incident which occurred on
October 21, 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, when the Rus-
sian Baltic fleet attacked a British fishing fleet near the Dogger-
Bank in the North Sea. The British demand for an apology, dam-
ages, and a severe punishment of the officer responsible was coun-
tered with the Russian argument that the Russian fleet had fired
because of the approach of Japanese torpedo boats. Both parties to
the dispute agreed to the establishment of a commission of inquiry
consisting of one representative each of Great Britain, the United
States, France, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. Under the terms of
the agreement, the commission's mandate was to inquire into and
report upon all of the circumstances relative to the incident and,
particularly, upon the question of responsibility. On the basis of
the commission's report, Russia paid an indemnity. Following the
Dogger-Bank incident the Hague Convention of 1907 institution-
alized the procedure relating to the establishment and functions of
international commissions of inquiry, stating that such commissions
3 Pertinent discussions of the powers and functions of international river commis-
sions may be found in BAXTER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS 96-148
(1964); GORoVE, LAW AND POLITICS OF THE DANUBE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
STUDY 25, 128 (1964).
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were to investigate the circumstances of a case and were to issue a
report limited to a statement of the facts.4
Another incident necessitating the establishment of a commis-
sion of inquiry occurred on January 25, 1912, during the Turko-
Italian War. The French north steamer Tavignano, suspected of
carrying contraband, was seized by the Italian torpedo boat Tulmino
near the coast of Tunis and was taken to Tripoli. Since this suspi-
don could not be substantiated, the vessel was released on the fol-
lowing day, January 26, 1912. On the same day and in the same
vicinity, two Tunisian boats, the Camouna and the Gaulois, were
fired upon by an Italian torpedo boat. France demanded indemnity
from the Italians, charging that the incident had occurred in Tuni-
sian waters. Italy's contention was that they had taken place on
the high seas.
The parties agreed to submit the dispute to a commission of in-
quiry which was composed of one Italian and one French naval offi-
cer as members and a naval officer appointed by Great Britain as
president and which was given authority to investigate, mark, and
determine the exact geographic point at which the incidents had
occurred. The commission was empowered to secure all informa-
tion, interrogate and hear all witnesses, examine all papers on board
either of the ships, and to resort to all sources of information cal-
culated to bring out the truth. After an exhaustive investigation
the commission found that it was unable to mark the location with
sufficient specificity as to make a decision possible.5 Reference
may also be made to the establishment in 1905 by Great Britain
and the United States of an International Waterways Commission
to investigate and report upon the conditions and uses of the bound-
ary waters between the United States and Canada.'
In addition to these specific examples, there were, of course,
many instances of the exercise of the right of visit and search dur-
ing and after the quarter-century.7 Later on inspection rights were
4 OPPENHBIM, op. cit. supra note 2, § 11b.
rIbid.
6 BAxTm, op. cit. supra note 3, at 107.
7 Apart from agreements relating to the two world wars and the Spanish Civil War,
the agreements and declarations pertaining to conflicts, for instance, in Indonesia, Is-
rael, Korea, Laos, Viet Nam, the Congo, Cuba, and Cyprus furnish many contemporary
examples of the establishment of investigatory or supervisory (control) commissions
and other bodies. It should be emphasized, however, that many of these commissions,
particularly those established in Israel, Korea, Laos, and Viet Nam, have often found
their work impeded to a point bordering on futility.
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extended to entirely new areas.' It should also be noted that many
of these precedents reflected ad hoc institutions rather than interna-
tional administrative organizations of a more permanent character.
Further, some of them included inspecting functions, but not neces-
sarily verifying ones.
II. A CASE HISTORY OF WORKING ON-SITE
INSPECTION: THE IAEA SYSTEM
None of the earlier precedents involve, from the standpoint of
security, so sensitive an area as the field of atomic energy. The idea
of applying international safeguards, including on-site inspection,
to assure the peaceful use of atomic energy grew out of the concern
that nuclear assistance to nonatomic powers would carry with it a
potential spread of atomic weapons capability to such nations. In
recognition of this concern, a series of bilateral agreements between
more or less atomically advanced nations gave inspection rights to
the country supplying assistance.' These bilateral accords were
soon complemented by multilateral agreements pertaining to such
global organizations as the IAEA and such regional organizations
as the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)"° and the
European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA) of the Organization for
8 Compare the Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, [1961] 1 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No.
4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, which provides for an inspection system under which any signa-
tory state has the right unilaterally to designate its own nationals as inspectors with the
more recent Outer Space Treaty which stipulates that all stations, installations, equip-
ment, and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open on a re-
ciprocal basis to representatives of other states which are parties to the treaty (art. 12).
55 DEP'T STATE BULL. 953 (1966).
9 On the inspection and control systems incorporated in bilateral agreements be-
tween nations, see Gorove, Controls Over Atoms-for-Peace: U.S. Bilateral Agreements
with Other Nations, 4 COLtJm J. OF TEANSNAT'L L. 181 (1966); Gorove, Controls
Over Atoms-for-Peace Under Canadian Bilateral Agreements with Other Nations, 42
DENVER L. CENTER J. (formerly DICTA) 41 (1965); Gorove, Safeguarding Atoms-
for-Peace: U.K. Bilateral Agreements with Other Nations", 68 W. VA. L REv. 263
(1966); Seaborg, Existing Arrangements for International Control of Warlike Material-
5: The United States Program of Bilateral Safeguards, in 2 DISARMAMENT & .ARMs
CONTROL 442 (1964).
10 For a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of Euratom's inspection and control
procedures, see Gorove, The Pirst Multinational Atomic Inspection and Control System
at Work: Euratom's Experience, 18 STAN. L. REV. 160 (1965). For brief assessments,
see Gorove, Lessons From the Control of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Eura-
tom, 58 PROCEEDINGS AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 136 (1964); Gorove, Inspection and Con-
trol in Euratom, 23 BULL. ATOMIC SCI. 41 (March 1967); Hahn, Control Under the
Euratom Compact, 7 AM. J. CoMp. L. 23 (1958). For a lucid summation, see Van Hel-
mont, Le Contr6le D'Euratom, Expos6 fait l'Association Allemande de Politique Ex-
t~rieure Bonn Feb. 22, 1963.
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European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), now known as the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)."
A. The Basic Framework
On-the-spot inspection with verification is an essential feature
of the IAEA safeguards system over atoms destined exclusively for
peaceful purposes, much the same as it is a focal point of other in-
ternational control arrangements. In language bearing a dose re-
semblance to the other atomic inspection systems, the IAEA statute
gives the Agency the right as well as the responsibility to send in-
spectors into the territory of the state or states concerned in order
to determine whether there has been compliance with the required
pledge not to use Agency assistance or safeguarded items in such
a way as to further any military purpose. Thus, inspectors are
charged with the duty of obtaining and verifying, on the spot, if
necessary, the accounting for materials placed under safeguards and
must report any noncompliance to the Director-General of the
Agency.
12
In line with the foregoing statutory provisions and following
the establishment of the administrative machinery, the IAEA Board
of Governors in 1961 transmitted to the General Conference a doc-
ument on the Agency's inspectors' 3 (called the Inspectors Docu-
ment) which - much as the Safeguards Document of 1961'" or
the Additional Safeguards Document of 1964's or the document
IlAn informative account of ENEA's security control system may be found in
Vignes, Le Systhme de Contr6le de Sgcurit6 de l'Agence Europenne pour l'Energie Nu-
claire, 7 ANNUAIRE FRANCAiS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 555 (1961). Compara-
tive appraisals of the international atomic control arrangements are given in Gorove,
International Security Controls: From the Atom to Cosmic Space, in 1963 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SIXTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 1; Gorove, Controls Over
Atoms-for-Peace: Some Pacts and Implications for Nuclear Disarmament, 27 LA. L.
REV. 36 (1966); Wolff, The Legal and Factual Problems of International Security Con-
trol in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 4 DnUTTO ED ECONOMIA NUCLEARE 179 (1962).
12 INT'L ATOMIc ENERGY AGENCY STAT. art. XII, para. C [hereinafter cited as
JABA STAT.). Under article XII, paragraph B, the inspectors are also required to ex-
amine all operations conducted by the Agency itself to determine whether the Agency
is taking adequate measures to prevent the source and special fissionable materials in its
custody or used or produced in its operations from being used in furtherance of any
military purpose.
13 I.A.E.A. Doc. GC (V)/INF/39 (1961).
14 I.A._.A. Doc. INCIRC/26 (1961). Known as the Safeguards Document, it con-
rains the principles and procedures of the Agency's safeguards system. Despite the
system's revision in 1965, the provisions of the Safeguards Document, including those
pertaining to inspection, have been incorporated in a number of Agency agreements
and, as such, will continue to be applied, unless all states which are parties to such agree-
ments request to substitute the provisions of the revised system. See note 16 infra.
15 The Additional Safeguards (Extension) Document which was approved by the
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embodying the 1965 Revision of the Safeguards System16 - was
intended to serve as a guide for negotiating provisions that would
normally be included in agreements between the IAEA and the
states concerned to the extent that they were relevant to such ar-
rangements. The Inspectors Document elaborates in great detail
on the designation and sending of inspectors into the state's terri-
tory. The Document's stipulation, as well as any additional provi-
sions, are only given legal effect upon the entry into force of the
particular project 7 or other safeguards agreement 8 which incorpo-
rates them. 9
B. Designation and Composition of the Agency Inspectorate
The language of the IAEA statute makes it clear that the desig-
nation of Agency inspectors may take place only after consultations
between the Agency and the state or states concerned.20 The pur-
pose of these consultations is to secure a mutually satisfactory agree-
ment regarding the designation. Under the Inspectors Document,
the proposal to designate an Agency inspector for a state must be
made by the Director-General in writing. It must inform the state
of the name, nationality, and grade of the Agency official proposed,
and it must be accompanied by a written certification of the nomi-
Board on February 26, 1964, extended the application of the safeguards system to reac-
tors of more than one hundred thermal megawatts output I.A.E.A. Doc. INFCIRC/
26/Add. 1 (1964).
16I.A.E.A. Doc. GC(IX)/294 (1965). The significant revisions incorporated in
this document will be noted whenever relevant to the subject under discussion.
17Project agreements were concluded by the Agency with a number of countries
including, for instance, the Congo (Leopoldville, now Kinshasa), Finland, Norway,
Pakistan, and Yugoslavia. I.A.E.A. Docs. INFCIRC/37 (1962), INFCIRC/24 Add. 1
(1960), INFCIRC/29/Mod. 1 (1961), INFCIRC/34 (1962), INFCIRC/32 (1961).
18Trilateral safeguards agreements involving the transfer to the Agency of the ad-
ministration of safeguards previously exercised under bilateral agreements were con-
cluded by the Agency, for example, with the United States and such third countries as
Argentina, Dec. 2, 1964, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 6004; Austria, June 15 and
July 28, 1964 [1965) 2 U.S.T. 1836, T.I.A.S. No. 5914; Israel, June 18, 1965, [1966]
1 U.S.T. 750, T.I.A.S. No. 6027; Japan, Sept. 23, 1963, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1265, T.I.A.S.
No. 5429; the Philippines, June 15 and Sept. 18, 1964, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1271, T.I.A.S.
No. 5879; the Republic of China, Sept. 21, 1964, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1616, T.I.A.S. No.
4882; South Africa, Feb. 26, 1965, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1281, T.I.A.S. No. 5880; and Viet-
Nam, Sept. 18, and Nov. 25, 1964, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1629, T.I.A.S. No. 5884. In addi-
tion, the Agency also entered into two safeguards agreements with the United States
whereby the latter placed some of its own reactors under Agency safeguards. See the
"Four-Reactor" Agreements of June 1, 1962, [1962] 1 U.S.T. 415, T.I.A.S. No. 5002
and June 15, 1964, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1456, T.I.A.S. No. 5621.
19 I.A.E.A. Doc. GC(v)/INF/39, para. 4 (1961).
20 TIAA STAT. art. XII, para. A(6).
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nee's relevant qualifications. The Director-General is also required
to enter into such other consultations as the state may request.2 '
Only Agency officials may be designated as inspectors. All
members of the staff including the Director-General may be so
designated except those who are locally recruited and assigned to
hourly rates.22 The aim of this limitation is to ensure that the
Agency will have adequate control over the activities of its inspec-
tors. The state is, in turn, required to inform the Director-General,
within thirty days of the receipt of the latter's proposal, whether it
accepts the proposed designation. If it does, the Director General
may then designate the official as an Agency inspector and notify
the state accordingly. If a state objects to the proposed designation,
it may do so not only at the time of the proposal but also at any
time after the designation has been made. A Japanese proposal
that objections by states to specific designations must be supported
by written evidence that the designee would be unable to perform
his duties competently and impartially was regarded as useful but
not essential, since all refusals that would frustrate the inspection
system were expected to be referred to the board. Thus, the state
is not obligated to indicate its reasons for refusing or accepting any
persons the Director-General may designate; the only obligation is
to make the objection known to the Director-General, who is then
required to propose one or more alternate designations.
The question also arises as to whether a state can lawfully con-
tinue to maintain its objection. The Soviet Union and the United
Arab Republic regarded the denial of the right of continued objec-
tion as a violation of sovereignty which no self-respecting state could
accept. Nonetheless, the Inspectors Document makes it clear that,
in case of a state's repeated refusal to accept a designation, the Di-
rector-General may refer the matter to the board for appropriate ac-
tion if, in his opinion, the refusal would impede the inspection pro-
2 1 I.AE.A. Doc. GC(V)INF/39/Annex, para. 1 (1961).
22 The Director-General of the IAEA is in charge of the international staff and is
responsible for its appointment, organization, and functioning. The staff which com-
prises the minimum required number of qualified scientific, technical, and other per-
sonnel, including inspectors, enjoy certain privileges and immunities. Highest stand-
ards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity are the paramount considerations
in the recruitment and employment of the staff with due regard to geographical repre-
sentation and to the contributions of members to the Agency. Both the Director-Gen-
eral and the members of the staff are obligated to refrain from seeking or receiving in-
structions "from any source external to the Agency." Subject to their responsibilities
to the IAEA, they are not permitted to disclose any industrial secrets or other confiden-
tial information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties for the
Agency. IAEA STAr. art. VII, paras. A, B, D, F. See IA.E.A. Docs. ]NFCIRC/9/Rev.
1 (1959), GC(IX)/294, para. 13 (1965).
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vided for in the relevant project or safeguards agreement.23 In such
a case the board can take any appropriate measures authorized by
the statute against states which fail to honor their obligations.24
Once a state has accepted the designation of persons as Agency
inspectors, it is under an obligation to grant or renew their visas
when required.25 The inspector may subsequently be assigned to
visit the state, either alone or as a member of an inspection team
consisting of other inspectors. In regard to the composition of such
teams, the Soviet Union proposed that they should be selected on
the basis of broad representation of the country on whose territory
the inspection was to be carried out, as well as of the states rendering
assistance to the Agency, and that their composition should be ap-
proved by the board after consultation with the states concerned.
The proposal, however, was not deemed essential inasmuch as it was
envisaged that for a considerable time to come inspections would
be carried out by one or two inspectors who could adequately per-
form the required functions. It was also realized that, like the rest
of the Agency's personnel, the staff of inspectors would be recruited
on the widest geographical basis possible, as required by the stat-
ute.26 Finally, it was not believed to be desirable for the Agency to
assume an obligation to assign more inspectors than necessary for
a specific inspection, especially in view of the fact that inspectors
may be accompanied by representatives of the state concerned."
In accordance with the prescribed procedures, the board, for in-
stance, in 1962 authorized the Director-General to designate, with
the approval of the Norwegian government, three members of the
Secretariat - nationals of Argentina, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia -
to make safeguards inspections on the NORA reactor in Norway.2"
The designation was made despite objections by Bulgaria, Poland,
and the Soviet Union and a warning by the latter that it might have
unfortunate consequences for the Agency since, in Moscow's view,
the composition of the inspecting team favored the states associated
with the political and military organizations of the Western coun-
tries and reflected the pro-Western leanings of the senior official of
2 3 I.A.E.A. Doc. GC(V)/INF/39, Annex, para. 2 (1961).
24 IAEA STAT. art. XIX, para. B.
2 5 I.A.E.A. Doc. GC(V)/INF/39, Annex, para. 3 (1961).
2 6 IAEA STAT. art. VII, para. D.
2 7 1AEA STAT. art. XIIA, para. A(6).
28 The NORA reactor was placed under Agency safeguards in 1961 by a project
agreement between the Agency and Norway. I.A.E.A. Doc. INFCIRC/29/Mod. 1,
Add. 1 (1961).
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the Agency. Similar designations, for example, of ad hoc Agency
inspectors - nationals of Argentina and Yugoslavia - were made
subsequently to carry out inspections under the 1962 Four-Reactor
Agreement with the United States, pending the appointment of
additional staff necessitated by an increase in the Agency's inspec-
tional responsibilities. More recently, following the second Four-
Reactor Agreement in 1964 and a number of trilateral transfer
agreements, many more designations have taken place."9
C. Visits by Agency Inspectors
By the terms of the Inspectors Document, the Agency is re-
quired to give at least one week's notice of each inspection, indicat-
ing the names of the inspectors, the places and approximate times
of their arrival and departure, and the facilities and materials to be
inspected. Since, in certain cases, a rapid inspection might be neces-
sary before circumstances changed and possibly made inspection
fruitless or much more difficult, it was provided that not more than
twenty-four hours' notice need be given for any inspector to investi-
gate an incident requiring a so-called "special inspection.""
Agency inspectors may be accompanied by representatives of.
the state concerned if that state so requests, provided that the inspec-
tors are not thereby delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of
their functions.31 The stipulation that Agency inspectors are re-
quired to use such points of entry into and departure from the state,
as well as such routes and modes of travel within it as may be re-
quired by the state, has been included on the proposals of the Soviet
Union and the United Arab Republic and appears to constitute a
somewhat unfortunate limitation which may well result in the im-
position of unreasonable restrictions. 2
Since it may not be possible for Agency inspectors to take with
29 See note 18 supra.
30 A "special inspection" is required, for instance, in the event of unforeseen cir-
cumstances which necessitate immediate action. See LA.E.A. Docs. INFCIRC/26, para.
59 (1961); GC(V)/INF/39, Annex, para. 4 (1961). See also text accompanying notes
58-59 infra. A Soviet proposal would have required a sharing of the investigative
powers of the inspectors and a rephrasing of the language so that the inspectors would
participate in the investigation of any incident requiring a special inspection. While,
in many instances, it may be possible for Agency inspectors to join in one or more in-
vestigations conducted by the authorities of the state or the management of the enter-
prise, in some cases the Agency might wish to pursue an entirely different line of in-
quiry independently from any joint effort. For this reason the proposal was not adopted.
3 1IAEA STAT. art. XII, para. A.(6); LA.E.A. Doc. GC(V)/INF/39, Annex, para.
5, (1961).
32 LA.E.A. Doc. GC(V)/INF/39, Annex, para. 5, (1961).
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them all the necessary equipment, such as crane facilities or remote
handling instruments, for their work, the Inspectors Document,
despite Soviet opposition, includes a provision to the effect that in
locations where this is necessary, inspectors must, on request and
for reasonable compensation if agreed on, be provided with appro-
priate equipment for carrying out inspections. Furthermore, since
the inspectors are expected to visit for short periods, and sometimes
on short notice, remote installations where often no facilities are
available for the accommodation of persons not connected with the
enterprise, a stipulation was included to provide them with suitable
accommodations and transport!'
Finally, the visits and activities of the Agency's inspectors must
be arranged in such a way as to ensure, on the one hand, the effec-
tive discharge of their functions and, on the other hand, the mini-
mum possible inconvenience to the state and disturbance to the fa-
cilities inspected. Also, the Inspectors Document requires consulta-
tions between the Agency and the state concerned to ensure that,
consistent with the effective discharge of their functions, the activi-
ties of the inspectors will be conducted in harmony with the laws
and regulations existing in the state. 4
D. Right of Access and Inspection
Following the submission of their credentials, and to the extent
relevant to the project or arrangement, Agency inspectors are to be
accorded access at all times to all places and data, and to any person
who, by reason of his occupation, deals with materials, equipment,
or facilities which are required by the statute to be safeguarded, as
necessary to account for source and special fissionable materials sup-
plied and fissionable products and to determine whether there has
been compliance with the undertaking against their use for military
purposes and with any other conditions prescribed in the agreement
between the Agency and the state or states concerned. The state is
required' to direct all such persons under its control to cooperate
fully with Agency inspectors and to indicate the exact location of
all such materials, equipment, and facilities and identify them. 5
33 Id. para. 6.
34 Id. paras. 7 and 8.
35 IAEA STAT. art. XII, para. A.(6); I.A.E.A. Doc. GC(V)/INF/39, Annex, para.
9, (1961). It may be noted that, when the 1962 Four-Reactor Agreement with the
United States was considered by the Agency, the Soviet Union was of the opinion that
under the proposed accord the provisions of the Inspectors Document relating to ac-
cess to materials, places and persons - without which no proper control could be exer-
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E. Procedure and Frequency of Routine Inspections for
Reactor Facilities Under One Hundred Thermal Megawatts
The Agency may make routine inspections of the facility and
material to which Agency safeguards are applied, beginning at the
time specified in the relevant agreement.3" An initial inspection
includes the examination of the facility during construction, the
major purpose being to ensure that it is constructed in accordance
with the approved design specifications. In addition, in order to
apply safeguards to reactors, the Agency needs to determine their
maximum potential plutonium production, which is a function of
the maximum power at which they can be operated. To calculate
the reactor's potential production capacity, it is desirable to inspect
certain components during construction, since their characteristics
may affect its power and access to them may become impossible
once the reactor has begun to operate. Also included within the
meaning of the term is the testing of any equipment that is used to
measure materials in the facility to which Agency safeguards are
applied, but only to the extent necessary to check their proper func-
tioning and without reference to their design."
After the facility is in operation, routine inspections are carried
out in accordance with the pertinent agreements, which may include
provision for: (1) examination of the facility and/or materials to
which Agency safeguards are applied; (2) audit of reports and rec-
ords; and (3) verification, by physical inspection, measurement, and
sampling, of amounts of materials to which Agency safeguards are
cised - would not be applicable. Under the eventual agreement (art. III, Annex A.),
the only significant limitation related to access to places, which was confined to the
four reactor facilities placed under Agency safeguards. "Four-Reactor" Agreements be-
tween the United States and the IAEA, June 1, 1962, [1962] 1 U.S.T. 415, 424, T.I.A.S.
No. 5002.
36 See, for instance, Agency agreements with Norway, Annex B, para. 7, and with
Pakistan, Annex A., para. C.(10), where it is specified that the routine inspections
would begin when any of the supplied material was first received at the reactor facility.
See also the 1962 Four-Reactor Agreement with the United States, Annex B., para. 4,
and the Agency's trilateral agreements with Japan and the United States, Annex B.,
para. 4, which provide that routine inspections shall begin when the agreements be-
come effective. "Four-Reactor" Agreements between the United States and the IAEA,
June 1, 1962, [1962] 1 U.S.T. 415, 424, T.I.AS. No. 5002.
37The document embodying the revised safeguards system distinguishes "initial"
inspection from other "routine" inspections. The purpose of the former is to verify
that the construction of a principal nuclear facility is in accordance with the design re-
viewed by the Agency. The testing at such an initial inspection may include the ob-
servation by inspectors of commissioning or routine tests by the staff of the facility, but
must not hamper or delay its construction, commissioning or normal operation. I.A.E.A.
Doc. GC(IX)/294, para. 52 (1965).
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applied and the testing of measurement instruments.3 8 Routine in-
spections are required for each facility to which safeguards are ap-
plied. Facilities subject to only nominal safeguards because of the
small amount of nuclear materials involved are excepted.3
The question of the frequency of such inspections elicited two
sharply different points of view in 1960 in the Special Working
Group of Expert Representatives on Safeguards, composed of seven
countries and presided over by the Norwegian delegate. One view-
point, strongly upheld by the Soviet Union, was that the Board
should not lay down limits in advance but rather should fix fre-
quency in each case, bearing in mind such factors as the state of in-
dustrialization and the arms-production capacity of the state con-
cerned. Opposed to this was the Western position that, since the
finding of a criterion to determine scientific and industrial devel-
opment would open the door to subjective judgment and, in the
end, to discrimination, the question of the frequency of inspections
should be treated on the basis of available technical information.
To this end the United States, which had previously undertaken an
extensive study of the question of inspection frequencies adequate
to fulfill the purpose of safeguards, put forth, a formula founded on
scientific data which eliminated the concept of "state of industriali-
zation" and instead took into account the various types of material
and other factors such as the availability of technicians, previous
experience, and so on.4"
The final formula incorporated in the Safeguards Document
sets only the maximum frequency of routine inspections for reactor
facilities under one hundred thermal megawatts, permitting a con-
sideration of other factors in the determination of the actual num-
ber. The maximum frequencies are shown in the table below, the
first column indicating the annual usage or the maximum potential
production of plutonium, U-233 or U-235, expressed in equivalent
kilograms, and the second column showing the maximum inspec-
tion frequencies.
38 I.A.E.A. Docs. INFCIRC/26 para. 55 (1961); GC(V)/INF/39, Annex, para. 10
(1961). Under the revised safeguards system, routine inspections may also include a
check of the operations carried out at the relevant facilities. However, the inspectors
are neither to operate any facility themselves nor direct the staff of a facility to carry
out any particular operation. I.A.E.A. Doc. GC(IX)/294, paras. 49 and 49(d).
39 I.A.E.A. Doc. INFCIRC/26, para. 60 (1961).




Frequency of Routine Inspection
Annual Usage or Maximum Potential Maximum Number of
Production of PU, U-233, or U-235 Routine Inspections
(equivalent kilograms): per Year:
From 0.2 to 1 None (nominal safeguards)
More than I up to 5 1
More than 5 up to 10 2
More than 10 up to 15 3
More than 15 up to 20 4
More than 20 up to 25 5
More than 25 up to 30 6
The table41 reveals that a maximum of six annual inspections is
foreseen under a linear rule that adds one annual inspection for
every five equivalent kilograms of annual usage or maximum po-
tential production of plutonium or fissionable uranium isotopes.
Determination of the number of inspections in relation to the
amount of materials has been based on the technical judgment of
the Agency's Secretariat.
The actual frequency of inspections, which is kept to a mini-
mum consistent with the effective application of safeguards, de-
pends upon such factors as the state's possession of an irradiated
fuel reprocessing facility, the nature of the reactor facility itself, and
the nature and amount of the nuclear material used or produced in
the reactor facility.42 Bearing these points in mind, the inspections
must be timed so that, in the interval between inspections, the total
possible error in the measurement of the quantity of nuclear ma-
terial used or produced by the reactor facility could not amount to
more than 0.2 kilograms of plutonium, U-233, or fully enriched
U-235, or their equivalents.4 The inspections should make it pos-
sible for the Agency to detect any diversion for the production of
atomic weapons before they can be used.
The appropriate number of routine inspections is stated in each
project and safeguards agreement, and provisions are also included
for modifications in case of changed conditions. Thus, on the basis
of information received both from on-the-spot inspections and other
data, the Norwegian power reactor NORA, originally scheduled for
one inspection annually,4" and the TRIGA MARK II reactor in
41 I.A.E.A. Does. INFCIRC/26, para. 65 (1961), GC(IX)/294, para. 57 (1965).
42 1.A.E.A. Docs. INFCIRC/26, paras. 64 and 65 (1961), GC(IX)/294 paras. 47
and 57 (1965).
43 .AX.A. Doc. INFCIRC/26, para. 65 (1961).
44 See the IAEA's Project Agreement with Norway, I.A.E.A. Doc INFCIRC/29
(1961).
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Finland were placed under nominal safeguards in 1962 and were
thereby exempted from further routine inspections.45 The Project
Agreement between the Agency and Pakistan provided for two rou-
tine inspections annually from the time any of the supplied material
was first received at the reactor facility.46 The 1962 Four-Reactor
Agreement between the Agency and the United States provided for
two inspections per year each for the Brookhaven Medical Research
Reactor and the Piqua Organic Moderated Reactor, four inspections
per year for the Argonne Experimental Boiling Water Reactor, and
inspection at any time for the Brookhaven Graphite Research Reac-
tor facility.47 The first inspection took place in June 1962; subse-
quent inspections were carried out in November of that year and in
April 1963 at the Argonne and Brookhaven Graphite facilities.
While such inspections have brought out some problems, reportedly
none of them has proved insuperable.48
In 1963 the initial inspection of the TRICO reactor in the
Congo, which had been placed under nominal safeguards, was car-
ried out, as was the first inspection of the JEEPNIK subcritical fa-
cility in Kjeller, Norway.49 More recently, following the conclu-
sion of a large number of trilateral transfer agreements, many other
initial and routine on-site inspections were made by Agency inspec-
tors on nuclear facilities of member states.50
F. Routine Inspection of Large Reactor Facilities
In 1963, when the Special Working Group was considering the
extension of the safeguards system, Czechoslovakia, India, and the
Soviet Union argued that, from a scientific and technological view-
point, there was no justification for a linear extension of up to
twelve maximum inspections in the case of reactors using or pro-
ducing more than thirty but not more than sixty equivalent kilo-
grams of special fissionable materials annually. In their view, con-
siderably less than twelve inspections per year would be sufficient
because the various reactor types and the circumstances in which
45 I.A.E.A. Doc. GC(VI)/195, pp. 21-22 (1962).
4 6 I.A.E.A. Doc. INFCIRC/34, Annex A, para. C.(10) (1962).
47 See Annex B, para. 4 of "Four-Reactor" Agreements between the United States
and the IAEA, June 1, 1962, [1962] 1 U.S.T. 415, 424, T.I.A.S. No. 5002.
48 I.A.E.A. Docs. GOV/INF/81 (1962), GOV/INF/87 (1963); 47 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 970 (1962).
49 I.A.E.A. Doc. GOV/INF/99, p. 8 (1963).
50 For statistical information, see IAEA, Annual Reports of the Board of Governors
to the General Conference.
1540 [Vol.18: 1525
IAEA ON-SITE INSPECTION
they operated differed so extensively that no overall formula could
be devised; thus, they felt it preferable to determine each case sepa-
rately.
While the majority of the Working Group rejected this conten-
tion and felt that the maximum inspection frequency formula estab-
lished for small reactors could be linearly extended up to twelve, it
was realized that, as the inspection frequency reached that point and
extended beyond it, it would be difficult in practice to distinguish
between discrete inspections, thus lessening the desired effectiveness.
Thus, the Working Group concluded that for reasons of practica-
bility, economy, and effectiveness, a qualitatively different approach
should be used in the case of power reactors having a potential plu-
tonium production in excess of sixty kilograms per year; that is, the
reactor should be accessible to inspection at all times as envisaged
by the statute.51
The phrase "access at all times" drew strong opposition from
many nations, including the Soviet Union, since it was regarded as
meaning continuous inspection by the assignment of one or more
resident inspectors. However, a majority of the Working Group
stressed that the appointment of resident inspectors in no way fol-
lowed from the proposed principle, since the phrase in question
meant simply that the dates of inspection would not be fixed well
in advance so that the country would not know whether and when
it was going .to be inspected. Thus, the basic aim could also be
achieved, for instance, by the establishment of regional offices which
could regularly send inspectors to the countries of that particular
region.
The United States and the United Kingdom supported the con-
cept of "access at all times," pointing out that continuous inspec-
tion might well prove less inconvenient to reactor operators than
intermittent inspections which, in a large reactor facility, would
have to be frequent and intensive. They stressed that, when con-
sidering adequate safeguards for large reactor facilities, the crucial
problem was the large quantity of special fissionable material that
could be produced, since present measurement capabilities were only
ninety to ninety-five percent accurate, allowing for a margin of
error from five to ten percent even if subject (as might not neces-
sarily be the case) to independent verification by the Agency.
In other words, uncertainty in determining the annual pluto-
nium production of a 180 megawatt, water-cooled reactor produc-
51 IAXA STAT. art. XII, para. A(b).
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ing potentially about 150 kilograms of plutonium per year could
amount to as much as fifteen kilograms of plutonium, a quantity
which is unquestionably of military significance. To reduce -this
uncertainty, the Agency would have to be assured that only author-
ized material was inserted into or removed from the reactor facility,
that is, from both the core and the fuel storage area. It was thought
that this could only be done through extensive observation of the
reactor so as to verify that clandestine material was not being in-
serted or removed, either during periods of unobserved, normal re-
fueling or at any time when unscheduled refueling might be per-
formed.
In view of the fact that the Inspectors Document foresaw only
discrete inspections, that is, limited numbers and types of inspections
needed for the smaller reactors, modifications appeared necessary
in the case of continuous inspection by resident inspectors of large
reactor facilities. Accordingly, it was proposed before the Working
Group that a new section be added to the Inspectors Document to
the effect that the Agency could assign one or more resident in-
spectors to a facility or materials which might be inspected at any
time or continuously. The proposal required one week's notice for
the initial entry and two days' notice for the subsequent entry and
departure of a resident inspector. In addition, the draft provided
that a resident inspector for a particular facility could also inspect
other facilities in the same state after giving the same notice as re-
quired from nonresident Agency inspectors. The assignment of one
or more resident inspectors to a facility, however, was not expected
to preclude the dispatch of other inspectors to assist them in making
a particular inspection. In the case of continuous inspection, the
state was to receive routine reports at three-month intervals on the
results reported by the resident inspectors and supplemental special
reports under specified circumstances.
The proposal to revise the Inspectors Document did not come
to fruition, and the eventual formula incorporated in the Additional
Safeguards Document provides that the maximum frequency of
routine inspections during and after the construction of a large reac-
tor facility will be as shown in or as obtained from extrapolation
from the above table, which indicates the frequency of routine in-
spections of reactor facilities below one hundred thermal mega-
watts." When such an extrapolation shows a frequency in excess
52 See text accompanying note 35 supra, For similar provision under the Revised
Safeguards System, see I.A.E.A. Doc. GC(IX)/294, para. 57 (1965).
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of twelve per year, the Agency's inspectors must have access to the
facility at all times. In scheduling the actual inspections to be per-
formed with respect to a particular facility, the limitations and con-
siderations stated in regard to small reactor facilities must be taken
into account.53 However, under the Revised Safeguards System it
is noteworthy that whenever the Agency has the right of access to a
principal nuclear facility at all times, it may perform inspections
without notice insofar as this is necessary for the effective applica-
tion of safeguards. The actual procedures to implement these pro-
visions must be agreed upon between the parties concerned in the
relevant safeguards agreement."
Under the agreement of June 15, 1964, between the Agency
and the United States, in which the latter consented to place the
175,000 kilowatt Yankee Power Reactor - one of the largest in
operation in the United States - under JABA safeguards, the
Agency was authorized to designate one or more inspectors to be
stationed in the United States for the purpose of continuous inspec-
tion or to perform an indefinite number of discrete inspections, in-
cluding the right to inspect the safeguarded facilities without ad-
vance notice. " Exercising its right to unannounced visits, the
Agency conducted several surprise inspections, including the visits
in February of 1965 by Argentine and Japanese engineers and in
April of the same year by an Argentine representative of the
Agency." ' As of February 16, 1967, ten inspections had taken
place. Reportedly, the visits caused no inconvenience to plant op-
erations and did not raise any problem of security. Largely as a
result of the experience acquired in the Yankee operation, inter-
national inspection is now using a simplified technique whereby a
distinctive tape and seal are placed on the core of the reactor, which
then cannot be opened without breaking them. Since the pattern
of the tape and seal, much like a fingerprint, cannot be duplicated
after removal from the reactor, it is impossible surreptitiously to re-
place them. If the tape and seal are unbroken, therefore, it is evi-
dence that none of the fuel rods containing the by-products suscep-
tible of military use have been removed from the core of the reactor.
A major advantage of this verification technique is that it does not
531A.E.A Docs. INFCIRC/26/Add. 1, para. 6 (1964), GC (IX) /294, para. 57
(1965).
54LAY-A Doc. GC(JX)/294, para. 50 (1965).
55 
"Four-Reactor" Agreements between the United States and the IAEA, June 15,
1964, art. III, § 14, [1964) 2 U.S.T. 1456, 1460, T.LA.S. No. 5621. See note 18 supra.
r6 N.Y. Times, April 9, 1965, P. 3, cols. 6-7.
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necessitate frequent or lengthy inspections. All that it requires is
an occasional check to assure that the tapes and seals have not been
tampered with."
G. Special Inspections
If the examination of a special report sent by the safeguarded
facility indicates the need, the Agency is authorized to conduct a
special inspection to investigate the occurrence. When unforeseen
circumstances seem to require immediate action, a special inspection
may also be held, provided that an account of the circumstances
leading up to such action is later given to the Board.5" In all proj-
ect and safeguards agreements, except those for which continuous
or unannounced inspection is provided, there are provisions for spe-
cial inspections which may be held even in the case of nominal safe-
guards, which as a rule involve no routine inspections."
It should be pointed out that special inspections do not neces-
sarily mean that a state is under suspicion, since the necessity might
arise in other cases as well - as when a state transfers uranium
rods to which Agency safeguards are attached from one reactor to
another, or wishes to remove safeguarded material from a reactor
to a storage well which was not open to inspection, and so on.
III. PERSPECTIVES AND EXPECTATIONS (1968-1992)
On-site inspection for the purpose of verifying compliance with
an agreement constitutes only one form of assurance that noncom-
pliance will be detected. The degree of assurance will, of course,
vary with the effectiveness of the inspection system and the par-
ticular circumstances of each case. However, it may well be pointed
out that even an ideal inspection system could not provide one hun-
dred percent assurance that every violation will automatically be
uncovered. To be sure, new techniques and discoveries may im-
prove upon the art of detection, but the element of human fallibility
will remain.
Inspection carried out on the spot by persons specially appointed
57 N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1967, p. 7, col. 1.
58 I.A.E.A. Doc. INFCIRC/26, paras. 58, 59 (1961).
59 See, for instance, projects agreements with the Congo, Annex A, para. C.(10),
I.A.E.A. Doc. INFCIRC/37 (1962); Norway Annex B, para. 7, I.A.E.A. Doc. INE-
CIRC/29/Mod.1 (1960); I.A.E.A. Doc. INFCIRC/24/Add. 1 (1960); Pakistan, Annex
A, para. C.(10), Yugoslavia, Annex A, para. C.(10). See also the "Four-Reactor"
Agreements between the United States and the IAEA, March 30, 1962, Annex B, para.
4, [1962] 1 U.S.T. 415, 424, T.I.A.S. No. 5002.
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for the purpose is a complex task involving many technical prob-
lems, organizational procedures, and matters of human relations.
The integrity and competence of the inspecting staff and their fa-
miliarity with the design and operations of the safeguarded enter-
prises are vital for an efficient control system which will avoid er-
ror and follow up discrepancies. While there is undoubtedly a
deep-rooted psychological problem involved in the presence of in-
ternational inspectors (occasionally because the inspectors are of a
particular nationality) on a sovereign state's territory, it has been
found that consultations with the domestic authorities prior to the
arrival of the inspecting team, their accompaniment by national
officials, and informal discussions of any discrepancies found may
help alleviate ill feelings. On the other hand, the suggestion that
health and safety inspections be combined with safeguards inspec-
tions to prevent military diversion, as originally envisaged by the
IAEA in the belief that it would promote good relations between
governments and inspectors and would render a positive service to
the world, has, largely for political reasons, proved impracticable."0
In the actual carrying out of its responsibilities, the IAEA has
attempted to keep on-site inspections to a minimum so long as, in
the judgment of the Agency, this minimum appeared to provide
a reasonable measure of assurance for detecting violations. The in-
spections revealed no diversion and created no insurmountable prob-
lems. Since the development of its "tape and seal" technique, the
JAEA has been able to prove that international inspection of atomic
power plants can be a relatively simple, unobtrusive, and yet effec-
tive operation.
The inspection procedures and techniques which the IAEA de-
veloped and the experience that it acquired during its relatively
short span of operations assume particular significance in view of
our trend perspectives, potentials, and expectations with respect to
international control over the atom. Today, nuclear energy is being
used to produce more than eight thousand megawatts of electric
power; by 1970, production is expected to reach more than thirty
thousand megawatts and -by 1980 there is every indication that it
will reach 200,000 megawatts. 1 Since it is impossible to operate
nuclear 'power plants without producing fissionable materials which
can be converted for use in nuclear weapons, and because such weap-
60 Gorove, International Security Controls: From the Atom to Cosmic Space, 1963
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH COLLOQUIUM ON T LAW OF OUTER SPACE 3.
01 IAEA Press Release No. 598, at 3 (December 21, 1966).
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ons are becoming easier to build, comprehensive international con-
trol (which under present techniques necessitates on-site inspections)
is ever more urgent if we are to prevent proliferation.
Until fairly recently, the application of IAEA's inspection sys-
tem has been limited to a handful of isolated projects. The break-
through came during the past few years, largely as a result of en-
lightened United States initiative as evidenced by the large scale
transfer to the Agency of certain inspection and control functions
previously exercised by the United States under most of its bilateral
atoms-for-peace agreements. The impact of this breakthrough is
indicated by the fact that the total number of reactors subject to
IAEA control at the end of 1966 reached fifty-seven, with a com-
bined capacity of 2,500 thermal megawatts. This figure relates to
reactors located in twenty-five countries and, since 1966, includes
one of the most powerful reactor combines, the Bradwell nuclear
power station, which was placed under IAEA inspection by the
United Kingdom much the same as the Yankee reactor had been by
the United States."2
Today, the future of the JAEA inspection system looks more
promising than at any time in the past. New responsibilities are
expected to emerge not only from the conclusion of additional trans-
fer agreements but also from the full-fledged approval of inspection
procedures for reprocessing plants which is expected in the near fu-
ture."3 But perhaps the greatest boost to the IAEA inspection sys-
tem could come from a nonproliferation treaty if it made provision
for the Agency to inspect some or all transnational transfers of nu-
clear materials and to do the same with respect to some or all nu-
clear power plants in nonnuclear-weapon states to assure peaceful
uses. Additional potentials may also arise from a Latin American
or other regional treaty establishing a nuclear-free zone if provision
is made for JAEA inspection.
It is a fact, of course, that many Western European and Latin
American nations have been reluctant to accept IAEA inspectors
because of the Communist nations' representation in the Agency's
inspectorate, and it is also a fact that Russia still opposes interna-
tional inspection on Soviet territory. However, it is of some signifi-
cance that in the fall of 1966 Poland and Czechoslovakia offered
to place their civilian atomic reactors under Agency inspection if
62 8 IAEA BULL. 4 (Sept. 1966).
63 Ibid.
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West Germany did the same. 4 Whether such an agreement will
materialize - either separately or within the framework of a non-
proliferation treaty - will depend, apart from the national attitudes
of the affected states and the nuclear powers, upon the response of
regional atomic organizations like Euratom.
In sum, while many barriers arising from national suspicion,
fear, or jealousy will undoubtedly have to be overcome to make the
proposed agreements palatable for all concerned, any such develop-
ments would considerably enhance the role of the Agency and might
pave the way toward its serving as a policing instrument in relation
to future nudear disarmament arrangements.
64 N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1966, p. 1, coL 3.
